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NEW HOPE FOR NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM 
 
JULIE YOO 
 
 
Abstract:  Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses:  first, that 
mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is 
true.  Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, 
one must abandon the other.  In this paper, I present an account of property 
realization that addresses Kim’s criticism and that explains how the two theses 
are indeed comfortably compatible.    
 
 
 
The Problem 
 
Non-reductive physicalists want to hold on to the idea that higher-level properties – mental 
properties, especially – have an autonomous ontological standing, and hence, their own 
distinctive causal powers.  But their equal commitment to physicalism threatens to undermine 
this commitment to the autonomy of higher-level properties.  This is, in effect, Kim’s dilemma 
for non-reductive physicalism:  it is inherently unstable because the physicalism denies the 
irreducibility thesis, while the irreducibility thesis denies physicalism (Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, 
2005).  In this paper, I shall to propose a novel way of solving this dilemma.   
 
 
The Way Out of the Bind:  Reducing Higher-Level Properties While Retaining their Powers 
 
My argument, in a nutshell, is this.  A property exists if and only it can confer causal powers 
upon its bearers.  Properties are individuated in terms of the distinctive range of causal powers 
each of them are capable of conferring.  Now, mental properties confer causal powers completely 
in virtue of the physical properties on which they logically supervene, but no mental property is 
identical with a physical property.  The concept of property realization renders possible the 
consistent conjunction of these two strands – irreducibility and physicalism.   
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Let us get started with a picture of multiple realizability to get us oriented with respect to 
its sister notion of property realization.  On standard accounts of multiple realizability, it is 
believed that different physical properties – different physical types of kinds – P1, P2, … Pn, can 
each necessitate one and the same type of mental M (or higher-level) property:  
 
Fig. 1      M 
 
 
 
R1  R2  …  Rn 
 
While this picture isn’t wrong, the schematic nature of the diagram engenders an oversimplified 
way of thinking about realization that is misleading.  It is misleading in that it gives the 
impression that a given realization R is a single physical property.  But this convenient 
simplification obscures an important detail, much attended to by the emergentists, to their credit, 
and it is that a mental property is a property of a system made up of concrete aggregates and 
whose micro-physical properties and relations make the operations of the whole system or 
mechanism possible.   To say that a property is multiply realizable is to say that a number of 
different kinds of systems or mechanisms – ones that are not only made up of different kinds of 
materials, but that also have different kinds of architectural configurations – can execute one and 
the same function.  Think of the indispensible corkscrew:  there is the rack and pinion model, the 
waiter’s corkscrew, and the rigid coiled wire with a convenient handle.  Each of these different 
kinds of mechanisms counts as a distinct type of realization;  that is, the rack and pinion model is  
R1, the waiter’s corkscrew is R2, and so on.  A more careful look at what’s going on suggests that 
a concrete instance of a given realization is best represented as being made up of inter-related 
micro-physical aggregates a1, a2, …, an, having micro-physical properties P1, P2, …, Pn, whose 
causal powers “constitute” the causal powers of M:  
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Fig.  2      M 
 
 
      R1    R2   . . . Rn 
 a1  a2 an       b1    b2 bn    
 P1 P2 Pn  Q1 Q2 Qn 
 
The realizing base of M is the micro-physical properties P1, P2, …, Pn of the constituent 
aggregates a1, a2, …, an, which they instantiate in virtue of being the type of material or 
substance they are.1  Now, if physicalism is true, then each of these properties have causal 
powers that fully determine the causal powers of M.  M, to use an emergentist term, is a resultant 
of each of the micro-physical properties P1, P2, … Pn.  The question, then, is how M is capable of 
having its own distinctive causal powers, given that M’s powers are fully derived from its 
realizing base.  The answer lies in drawing a connection between two things:  a causal power 
conception of the nature of properties (Shoemaker 1984), now often called the “Eleatic theory of 
properties,”2 and the phenomenon of universalizability, as described by Robert Batterman (2000, 
2001).  I begin with universality.  
To the extent that each mental property, by all appearances, has a unique array of causal 
powers (the total facts about which a complete empirical functionalist analysis of mental 
properties would deliver) it satisfies a necessary condition for being a distinctive genuine 
property.  Now, one of the remarkable things about nature is that there are higher-level 
regularities that are realized by very heterogeneous mechanisms.  That is, wildly different kinds 
                                                 
1 Actually, Fig. 2 may also be too schematic.  Depending on how we want to individuate the a’s, it is possible for a 
given a to have many properties P, not just a single property in the way Fig. 2 represents.  Take a particular 
corkscrew x and say that x is the rack and pinion kind.  The individual x has the macro-property M of being a 
corkscrew in virtue of x’s being composed of two handle bars, a flange, spindle, metal spiral, etc..  These are the a’s 
that have the P’s whose collective instantiation makes it possible for the a’s to constitute x and enable it to do its 
thing.  Now, the handle bars alone would have the properties of being handle-bar shaped, being rigid, being made of 
metal, and so on, so a given a is most likely to have properties P.  I won’t be too fussy about this detail, as Fig. 2 is 
sufficient as a working model.) 
2 The Eleatic theory of properties is so called because the conception goes back to Plato’s Eleatic stranger in the 
Sophist, who suggests that the mark of being is power.  This idea is also codified in what Kim calls “Alexander’s 
principle,” named after the emergentist, Samuel Alexander, who argued that a property must have causal powers to 
exist. 
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of systems manage to accomplish the same kinds of tasks.  This phenomenon is what Jerry Fodor 
1997 has called a “metaphysical mystery” –  how, in essence, things that are so different can still 
give rise to things that are the same: 
 
The very existence of the special sciences testifies to reliable macro-level 
regularities that are realized by mechanisms whose physical substance is quite 
typically heterogeneous.  - - Damn near everything we know about the world 
suggests that unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at 
the extreme micro-level manage somehow to converge on stable macro-level 
properties.   
 On the other hand, the ‘somehow’ really is entirely mysterious, … [for we 
don’t] see why there should be (how there could be) [macro-level regularities] 
unless, at a minimum, macro-level kinds are homogeneous in respect of their 
micro-level constitution.  Which, however, functionalists in psychology, biology, 
geology, and elsewhere, keep claiming that they typically aren’t.  (Fodor 1997, 
pp. 160 – 61) 
 
We see the mystery across the special sciences:  an animal’s fitness, for example, can be realized 
by its reproductive success, lack of predators, abundance of food, and the good fortune of not 
suffering odd accidents;  pain, to use everyone’s favorite example, can be realized by C-fiber 
stimulation, silicon chips, or hydraulic mechanisms – all at least in principle.  With all the 
heterogeneity at this lower level, it is indeed mysterious how they manage to give rise to stable, 
recurring, patterns and regularities that appear to hold with nomological force.  (The converse is 
equally mysterious, namely, how such few types of fundamental particles, laws, and forces, give 
rise to the complexity and heterogeneity of our world, but this is a slightly different matter that 
will not be addressed here.) 
In his “Multiple Realizability and Universality,” Batterman explains how the mysterious 
phenomenon, called “universality,” is explained in physics.  Multiple realizability is an instance 
of universal behavior.  Universal behavior is where vastly different systems – systems with 
different microstructures, different architectures, different properties – exhibit identical behavior 
when characterized at some level of description: 
  
To begin to get an idea about the concept of universality as well as its ubiquity, 
consider the following homely example.  One wants to explain the observed 
common behavior of pendulums – one wants, for example, to understand why 
pendulums with bobs of different colors, rods of different lengths, different 
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masses composed of diverse materials, etc., all have periods (for small 
oscillations) that are directly proportional to the square root of the length of the 
rod from which the bob is hanging.  At one level the explanation is quite 
straightforward:  one solves the very simple equation of motion for such a system. 
- - But there is another why-question which is far from simple.  Why, one might 
ask, are factors such as the color and (to a large degree) the constitution or micro-
structural makeup of the bobs irrelevant for answering our why-question about the 
period of the pendulums?  Why is this equation, rather than one in which, say, a 
color parameter plays a prominent role, explanatory?  In other words, what allows 
us to bracket, or set aside as ‘noise’ these other features of the individual 
pendulums as inessential or irrelevant for the explanation of the behavior of 
interest?  These latter questions concern the explanation of universal behavior.  
(Batterman 2000, pp. 120 – 121) 
 
As Batterman explains, physics has managed to identify universal behavior in all kinds of 
systems – systems of thermodynamics near their critical points, certain limit theorems of 
probability – and construct very detailed explanations of those variables that are relevant for the 
behavior of a system’s macro-level behavior (the length of the bob of the pendulum) and those 
that are mere negligible to the salient macro-level properties of the system (the color of a 
pendulum).  The lesson to take away from this, according to Batterman, is that there are 
“physical reasons why the details of the makeup of the individual realizers may be largely 
irrelevant for the upper level behavior of the system” (Batterman’s emphasis, 2000, p. 124).   
Now, while it is interesting that some of explanatory methods are sophisticated enough to 
handle universal behavior, our question is how our world is constructed so that it can display 
universal behavior while being composed of such a diverse heterogeneity of more basic physical 
(micro-physical) constituents.  The question is decidedly about the metaphysics of the 
phenomenon, the “truth-makers” in the world that make our explanations of universality true.  
On my view, we need to look to the Eleatic theory of properties to lay out that metaphysics.     
On the Eleatic theory, properties are those things in virtue of which the objects having 
them can enter into causal relations.  Thus, a property X is not the thing that has causal power K.  
Many people speak this way, but what they really mean is that a property confers causal powers.  
The things that have causal powers are individuals, like physical objects or events or other kinds 
of concrete particulars.  A property, then, is individuated in terms of the unique array of causal 
powers it confers upon the individuals that have it.  Its unique array is what I call its causal 
profile (see also Gillett 2002).  The notion is drawn from two observations.  First, that a property 
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in isolation from other properties is not enough to confer its bearer with a causal power, as many 
other contributing properties must also be instantiated.  A property, then, is one among many 
others that contribute to the causal power of an object:  
 
(α) A property X contributes to a causal power K in a given 
circumstance just in case  
i. X is necessary for K, and 
ii. X, together with a set of properties Γ , is minimally 
sufficient to confer K. 
 
Thus, the relationship between a property and a causal power is not one-to-one.  And this is the 
second observation:  it is, in fact, many-many.  For any property X, its instantiation in different 
circumstances can confer different causal powers, and for each type of causal power, different 
individuals can have that type of causal power though it instantiates different properties. 
 
 (β) Possibly, for any property X, Xi contributes to Ki and Xj 
contributes to Kj and Xi = Xj, but Ki ≠ Kj. 
 
(χ) Possibly, for any causal power K, Xi contributes to Ki and 
Xj contributes to Ki and Ki = Kj but Xi ≠ Xj. 
 
The individuation conditions for a property can be stated thus: 
 
(δ) X and Y are the same property just in case they have exactly 
the same causal profile:  for all actual and possible Ki and Kj, 
X contributes to Ki and Y contributes to Kj and Ki = Kj.   
 
The basic idea of (δ) is that X and Y are the same property if under all possible circumstances – 
all possible sets of properties Γ  with which they can be conjoined – they contribute to all and 
only the same causal powers.  For instance, if the property of having heat contributes to various 
causal powers in various circumstances – melt wax, boil water, bake brownies, …  – and the 
property of having a mean kinetic energy contributes to exactly the same causal powers in those 
same circumstances, then heat and mean kinetic energy are the same property.  But given that 
mean kinetic energy is only one realization of heat among other realizers, this means that there is 
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a circumstance where heat and mean kinetic energy contribute to different causal powers and 
thus count as different properties. 
 This theory about the nature of properties and their conditions for individuation gives us a 
very intuitive way of explaining the phenomenon of universality.  On my view, the capacity to 
behave in universal ways is built into the profile of each physical property. That is, the things 
that make up the profile of a higher-level property are the profiles of many lower-level properties 
acting in concert.  This is not emergentism.  Let us return to the theological story about our 
cosmology to see why.  A physicalist says that to create our world, God created physical 
particles, physical properties, and their governing laws, and nothing more.  I would add that God 
also created ways for those physical properties to combine with each other in universal-behaving 
ways, ways that the special sciences are so adept at describing. These higher-level properties are 
genuine because higher-level predicates refer to entities that have unique causal profiles. The 
comparison with fractals may be instructive here:  larger patterns, which are made up of smaller 
patterns, have properties that are unique to them.  But those properties are entirely derived from 
or are “resultants” out of the properties of the smaller constituent patterns;  it just so happens that 
the smaller patterns are constructed in such a way that they generate the larger patterns with their 
distinctive properties.  So we get the higher-level properties and regularities because of the 
complex ways that physical systems can behave, and solely due to their physical nature.   
Perhaps another example will be helpful here.  A wall will have certain properties that its 
individual component bricks do not have.  An obvious property will be its mass m.  For the 
purposes of illustration, let’s say that all bricks have somewhat different masses.  Now supposed 
that the wall were to engage in universal behavior with respect to its mass.  Then bricks of 
different masses would regularly combine to create a wall with mass m, in a variety of different 
contexts (inside, outside, during the day, during the night, … ), and in a number of different ways 
(the left side gets done first, then the right, or the layers get added one level at a time, or 
diagonally, … ).  They all lead to instances of wall-of-mass-m.  This is quite remarkable, but 
there is nothing but physical ingredients and physical laws at work here.  There need be no 
irreducible wall-of-mass-m property that imposes its causal powers from above.  All the causal 
powers for the wall with its mass come strictly from the causal powers of the individual bricks 
and their mode of combination.  Emergence doesn’t come into the picture.  It is a part of the 
nature of these bricks to form an object with the property of being a wall-of-mass-m.  But this is 
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no more mysterious than the fact that it is a part of the nature of an electron to attract protons.  
Insofar as the property of being wall-of-mass-m makes a causal difference, and makes it in its 
uniquely distinctive ways, then by the theory of properties I have laid out, this is a genuine 
property, as genuine as the properties at the fundamental level.    
The Eleatic theory is purely democratic when it comes to determining which properties 
exist.  The level doesn’t matter.  What matters is its profile.  If my approach to the metaphysics 
of universality is right, then a whirl of many properties P1, P2, … Pn and their corresponding 
profiles can give rise to a “larger” stable property M and with its corresponding profile, all 
thanks to nothing but the nature of the properties P1, P2, … Pn.  
 
 
Non-Reductive Physicalism and Downward Causation 
 
One would be right to wonder whether my view preserves the original non-reductive physicalist 
conception of the world as having different “layers” or “levels” that are hierarchically arranged.  
On one way of looking at it, my view places everything in one grand level, so that there is no 
hierarchy of different levels that exist in a metaphysically robust way.  Instead, all the entities 
and properties postulated by the sciences, special and micro-physical, are equally fundamental 
and mutually irreducible, living side by side, and running in and out of each other’s lives.  This 
picture is consistent with my view.  As long as it does not violate the supervenience relations 
between properties that belong to traditionally different levels – the biological supervening upon 
the chemical, and mental supervening upon the biological, and so on – it certainly does not force 
us to alter our ways of how the sciences are related to each other.   
The important part of this proposal is that the supervening properties do indeed have their 
own causal powers, and hence, ultimately brings about physical changes when the supervening 
properties are instantiated.  But it does so, not by exercising downward causation as on the 
classical emergentists view, but by constraining how the physical changes come about.  The 
view, then, that I present, may better be described as an account of downward determination.   
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